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ESSAYS
STUDENTS' RIGHTS AND HOW THEY ARE WRONGED*
Nadine Strossen**
Defending and enhancing the rights of students and young
people has always been a major priority for the American Civil
Liberties Union.' One reason is that the rights of our nation's
youth are always especially embattled2 -not surprisingly, since
they are not yet eligible to vote and, therefore, lack political
power.
We also champion the rights of young people because they
are our country's future voters and leaders. At some point, my
generation will be passing the torch of liberty to them. And we
want to know that they will carry it strongly and proudly,
* This essay is based on a speech Nadine Strossen delivered to the student
body at Germantown Academy in Fort Washington, Pennsylvania, on October 6, 1997.
** Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties
Union. For research and administrative assistance with this essay, the author thanks
her Academic Assistant, Amy L. Tenney, and her Research Assistants, Steven
Cunningham, Andrew G. Sfouggatakis, David Spiegelman, Claudia Oliveri, and Viktor
Hess. The author also wishes to thank Steven E. Bennett, Heather N. Stevenson, and
Scott J. Golightly of the University of Richmond Law Review for drafting most of the
footnotes. The author and her staff have worked closely with Scott Golightly, and
want to express their special appreciation for his professional excellence and diligence,
as well as his personal courtesy.
1. See, e.g., JANET R. PRICE ET AL., RIGHTS OF STUDENTS: BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO
A STUDENT'S RIGHTS (3rd ed. 1988); The ACLU Website, Students' Rights (visited Feb.
12, 1998) <http://www.aclu.orgissues/student/hmes.html>.
2. See generally Onora O'Neill, Children's Rights and Children's Lives, in CHII-
DREN, RIGHTS AND THE LAW 24 (Philip Alton et al. eds., 1992); Henry H. Foster, Jr.
& Doris Jonas Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAM. L.Q. 343 (1972); Patricia
M. Wald, Making Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 HUM. RTS. 13 (1974).
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standing up for not only their own rights, but also the rights of
everyone else in our society. We believe that if other people do
not respect the rights of young people, then young people are
less likely to grow up respecting the rights of other people.
The Supreme Court made this point in a landmark case that
upheld the free expression rights of public school students,
Tinker v. Des Moines School District,' decided in 1969. I am
proud that this historic decision was an ACLU case. We repre-
sented Mary Beth Tinker, a junior high school student, who
was suspended from school for wearing a black armband to
protest the Vietnam War.4 The Supreme Court declared that
students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
. . . expression at the schoolhouse gate."5 The Court also reaf-
firmed the crucial, long-term importance of respecting students'
rights in the following words:
That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is
reason for scrupulous protection of [their] Constitutional
freedoms .... if we are not to strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of
our government as mere platitudes.6
Unfortunately, Tinker was in many ways a high-water mark
for students' rights, and we have seen some sad back-sliding in
Supreme Court decisions about students' rights since then.7
3. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4. See id. at 504.
5. Id. at 506.
6. Id. at 507.
7. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (holding that
a school's policy to drug test athletes does not violate the students' Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273
(1988) (holding that a principal did not violate student First Amendment rights by
"exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as [his] actions [were] reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns"); id. at 273-74. (stating that the Tinker standard for
"determining when a school may punish student expression" is not the same as the
standard "for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources
to the dissemination of student expression"); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 685 (1986) (holding that the school district acted permissibly in imposing sanc-
tions on a student who gave "an offensively lewd and indecent speech" at a school
assembly, that the district's actions did not violate the student's First Amendment
rights, and that school officials were not prevented from determining that "vulgar
speech and lewd conduct" undermined the educational purpose of the school).
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That is part of a larger pattern. The Court that issued the
Tinker ruling, under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl War-
ren, was the most protective of constitutional rights that we
have ever seen.8 The Warren Court extended protection to
many groups in our society that previously had only second-
class status in terms of their constitutional rights because, like
students, they were relatively powerless in the political process:
for example, racial minorities,' religious minorities,' °
women," immigrants, 2  political radicals and dissenters, 3
people accused of crime, 4 and prisoners. 5
Unfortunately, since the Warren era, for the last couple of
decades, the Supreme Court has tended to look less favorably
on constitutional rights and civil liberties." There have been
cutbacks and assaults on all rights. 7 Especially embattled, as
always, are the rights of groups that are relatively disempow-
ered, and, unfortunately, that includes young people. 8
Lately, the ACLU has been working against a barrage of
measures that undermine the rights of minors. I will cite just
some examples:
8. See generally THE WARREN COURT. A RETOSPECTIVE (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1996).
9. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); Julius L. Chambers, Race and Equality, The
Still Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT, supra note 8;
Milner S. Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059
(1974).
10. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 902 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
11. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Sweezy v. Wyman, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
14. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
15. See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
16. See Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of
Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 805, 867 (1990); Nadine Strossen, Michigan Department of State Police
v. Sitz: A Roadblock to Meaningful Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 285 (1991); see generally DAVID SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING
OF THE REHNQUisT SUPREmE COURT (1992); THE BURGER COURT: THE CoUNTER-REvo-
LUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
17. See generally Nadine Strossen, The Current Assault on Constitutional Rights
and Civil Liberties: Origins and Approaches, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 769 (1997).
18. See id. at 798-804.
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- Censorship laws that specifically target media and expres-
sion that are particularly popular with young people, including
rap and rock music, 9  videogames, °  TV,2  cable,' and
cyberspace; 2
m Measures that block young people's access to important
information, e.g., by restricting their access to the Internet in
public and school libraries;2 4
0 Teen curfew laws, which effectively put all minors under
house arrest;
25
m Laws that treat juvenile offenders the same as adults,
including by imprisoning them with adults who have been con-
victed of brutal, violent crimes;2' and
19. See generally Leola Johnson, Silencing Gangsta Rap: Class and Race Agendas
in the Campaign Against Hardcore Rap Lyrics, 3 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTs. L. REV. 25
(1993/1994); The ACLU Website, Popular Music Under Siege (visited Feb. 15, 1998)
<http://www.aclu.org/library/pbr3.html>; see also The Social Impact of Music Violence,
Hearing Before the Senate Subcomm. on Oversight of Gov't Management Restructuring
and the District of Columbia, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of C. Delores Tucker,
Chair, National Political Congress of Black Women), available in 1997 WL 14153110.
20. See generally Matthew Hamilton, Graphic Violence in Computer and Video
Games: Is Legislation the Answer?, 100 DIcK. L. REv. 181 (1995).
21. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, S. 505, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (requir-
ing manufacturers to include a 'V-chip" in future television sets); see, e.g., Text of the
State of the Union Address, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1996, at A13; The ACLU Website,
Violence Chip (visited Feb. 15, 1998) <http-//www.aclu.org/library/aavchip.html>; The
ACLU Website, ACLU Expresses Concerns on TV Rating Scheme; Says 'Voluntary"
System is Government-Backed Censorship (visited Feb. 15, 1998)
<http'//www.aclu.orgnews/n022996b.html>.
22. See Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat.
949; Denver Area Educ. Telecom. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996).
23. See, e.g., George Cole, Censorship in Cyberspace, THE FIN. TIMES, Mar. 21,
1996; see generally Dawn L. Johnson, It's 1996: Do You Know Where Your Cyber Kids
Are? Captive Audiences and Content Regulation on the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 51 (1996); Ernest J. Walker, Note, The Communications Decen-
cy Act: A Cyber-Gag to First Amendment Rights On the Internet, 75 U. DET. MERCY
L. REv. 187 (1997).
24. See, e.g., Lisa J. Huriash, City Library to Offer Access to the Inter-
net-Children Will Have Viewing Restrictions, SuN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.),
Mar. 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3256361; Jeremy Redmon, Library Patrons Want
Net Block, Survey Shows, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1997; The ACLU Website, Virginia
County Restricts Net Access in Libraries (visited Apr. 27, 1998)
<http'//www.aclu.org/news/wl02497a.html>.
25. See Curfews and Common Sense, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1996; Michael
Janofsky, Teen-Agers in Washington Face New Curfew, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1996.
26. See The Violent Youth Predator Act of 1996, H.R. 3656, 104th Cong. § 1
(1996); see also The ACLU Website, Congress Considers Jailing Children with Adults
1998] STUDENTS' RIGHTS
m Various repressive measures in the schools, including mass
surveillance and search techniques-such as urinalysis drug
testing," drug-sniffing dogs," searches of lockers and back-
packs,29 and even strip searches 3°--and, as another example,
severe restrictions on any kind of student expression, ranging
from message t-shirts or other clothing, to artworks, to school
newspapers."'
I would like to quote a statement about why it is so impor-
tant for young people to be aware of, and concerned about,
constitutional rights. It was made by someone else, but I agree
with every word:
One of the great concerns of our time is that our young
people, disillusioned by our political processes, are disengag-
ing from political participation. It is most important that
our young become convinced that our Constitution is a
living reality, not parchment preserved under glass. 2
These are very timely words, especially in light of all the
recent evidence that young people are not particularly interest-
ed or involved in the political process-indeed, that many are
alienated from it.3" Thus, these words could have been spoken
(visited Mar. 18, 1998) <http://www.alcu.org/action/juvenile.html>. One should note
that imprisoning juvenile offenders with violent adults violates international human
rights law. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS: COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 18-39 (1988).
The ACLU has recently initiated a lawsuit on behalf of the parents of a young
man who committed suicide in a Texas adult prison, where he was repeatedly raped
and attacked. See The ACLU Website, Press Release (visited Mar. 18, 1998)
<http://www.aclu.org/news/n110597b.html>.
27. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Schaill v.
Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1989).
28. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a dog's snifig of a student's person was a "search" within the purview
of the Fourth Amendment).
29. See id. (holding that dog's sniffing of a student's locker in hallway did not
constitute a search); see also Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1981).
30. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Justices Let Stand Strip Search of Second-Graders;
Lower Court Had Ruled That School's Response to Theft Did Not Violate Girls' Rights,
WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 1997; Philip Franchine, Judge Backs Strip-Search of Student in
Orland Park, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25, 1992.
31. See Peter Baker, Censorship Ruling Has Student Newspapers Walking a Fine
Line, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1989; N.H. Student's Artwork Censored, Other Teen-Agers
Withdraw Their Own Displays in Protest, B. GLOBE, May 31, 1996;
32. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 972 (5th Cir. 1972).
33. See Bored and Lazy Freshmen, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 13, 1998, at A20; College
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:457
by any current leader. In fact, though, these words are as time-
less as they are timely. They were uttered by the respected
Judge Irving Goldberg more than a generation ago at the
height of the student activism movement. 4
Judge Goldberg's words are in many ways a credo for the
ACLU. I would like to explain why these words are important,
giving some basic information about our work on behalf of civil
liberties generally. I would also like to provide a context for my
discussion of our work on behalf of students' and young people's
rights. As Founding Father James Madison recognized, the
Constitution itself is only a piece of parchment, and hence a
"parchment barrier[ ]"" against government violations of indi-
vidual rights, since none of its provisions is self-executing. The
Constitution's words that articulate individual rights are worth
only the paper they are written on unless government officials
actually enforce them on behalf of actual individuals.
In fact, for too much of our history, constitutional rights were
mere paper promises, which were honored only in the breach.
That is exactly why the ACLU was founded in 1920-to actual-
ly breathe life into these words, by providing legal assistance
and other forms of support for victims of rights violations. 6
Think about the dreadful state of civil liberties at that time.
We had racial apartheid by law in many parts of our coun-
try."7 Women did not even have the right to vote, let alone
any other legal rights." Police broke into houses without
search warrants, looking for people with unpopular political
views, who were thrown into prison or deported, often without
any legal process.39 During World War I, 15,000 people were
arrested and imprisoned merely for peacefully criticizing the
United States war effort.40 At least one minister was impris-
Freshmen Have the Blahs, Survey Indicates; Academic, Civic Apathy Reach Record
Levels, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1998, Al.
34. See Shanley, 462 F.2d at 972.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
36. See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE
ACLU 46-47(1990); ACLU Briefing Paper #1, Guardian of Liberty: American Civil Lib-
erties Union (visited Feb. 11, 1998) <http://aclu.org/library/pbpl.html>.
37. See ACLU Briefing Paper #1, supra note 36.
38. WALKER, supra note 36, at 166-67.
39. See ACLU Briefing Paper #1, supra note 36.
40. See id.
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oned merely for saying the War was "unChristian."4 Another
citizen was jailed for reading the First Amendment aloud in
public.42 Now that's a subversive and dangerous act!
In order to respond to these terrible civil liberties violations,
the ACLU was founded with the goal of defending all funda-
mental freedoms for all individuals, no matter who they were,
and no matter what their political or religious beliefs were.43
Our organization's goal has always been to defend the rights of
everyone, including young people and students, because history
demonstrates that all rights are indivisible: if the government
is ceded the power to violate one right of one person or group,
then no right is safe for any person or group.'
Since the ACLU's founding in 1920, we have seen enormous
progress in securing civil liberties for all people, including
young people and others who are relatively powerless political-
ly. I am proud of the central role that the ACLU has played in
this positive development. As stated by historian Samuel Walk-
er in his 1990 book, In Defense of American Liberties: A History
of the ACLU, "[t]he history of the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion is the story of America in this century."45 Professor Walker
explained:
When the ACLU was founded in 1920, the promises of the
Bill of Rights had little practical meaning for ordinary peo-
ple. Today, there is a substantial body of law in all the
major areas of civil liberties: freedom of speech and press,
separation of church and state, free exercise of religion, due
process of law, equal protection, and privacy. The growth of
civil liberties since World War I represents one of the most
important long-term developments in modern American
history, a revolution in the law and public attitudes toward
41. See WALKER, supra note 36, at 156.
42. See id. at 54.
43. See, for example, WALKER, supra note 36, at 323-40, for a discussion of the
ACLU's defense of the right of American Nazi Frank Collin to demonstrate in Skokie,
Illinois, in 1977; see also Ken Chowder, The ACLU Defends Everybody, SMrrHSONIAN,
Jan. 1998, at 86.
44. See generally Nadine Strossen, Civil Liberties, 4 GEO. MAsON U. CV. RTs.
L.J. 253 (1994); Nadine Strossen, In the Defense of Freedom and Equality: The Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union Past, Present and Future, 29 HAR.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 143
(1994).
45. WALKER, supra note 36, at 3.
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individual liberty. Some have called it the "rights revolu-
tion" . . . . This change forms one of the great themes in
twentieth-century American history .... [I]t equals in
significance the commonly cited themes of industrialization,
urbanization, and American involvement in the world
economy.
The ACLU can legitimately claim much of the credit-or
be assigned the blame, if you prefer-for the growth of
modern constitutional law. Consult a standard constitution-
al law textbook and note the cases deemed important
enough to be listed in the table of contents-the proverbial
"landmark" cases. The ACLU was involved in over 80 per-
cent of them; in several critical cases, the Supreme Court's
opinion was drawn directly from the ACLU brief."
I recite this tribute to the improved state of civil liberties in
this country, and the ACLU's role in bringing that about, not so
that we should be content with what has already been achieved
and rest on our laurels. To the contrary, I do so for the
opposite reason: to inspire and encourage all who care about
individual rights to continue to fight for them. Despite our
progress, we still have a long way to go to ensure that the
fundamental freedoms of all individuals are fully and equally
respected.
In saying that more work needs to be done to secure civil
liberties, my benchmark is the simple but powerful statement
of ideals in our nation's founding document, the Declaration of
Independence: "All men are created equal and endowed
with inalienable rights."47
Obviously, we were nowhere near living up to these words at
the time they were written. They were aspirational, not descrip-
tive, in nature. And, while we have made significant progress
toward achieving that aspiration, we have not yet fully achieved
it.
In continuing our progress toward fulfilling our Founders'
ideal, individual people-including people who are relatively
unpowerful and unpopular-can make a tremendous difference,
not only for themselves, but also for others. This was the theme
46. Id. at 3-4.
47. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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of a wonderful book by Professor Peter Irons, a political scien-
tist who also has a law degree. In law school, of course, most of
the reading material consists of Supreme Court decisions, which
discuss legal issues, and contain almost no information about
the individuals who started the lawsuits that end up in the
high court, except their names (and sometimes not even that).
In light of his personal beliefs and experience, Peter became
intensely curious about the real people who gave not only their
names, but also so much of their time and energy, to the cases
that he was studying in law school.
As a young man, Peter had turned his draft card in to the
government, consistent with his philosophical and political be-
liefs, and consequently had to endure a prosecution and trial.48
He therefore knew, from personal experience, how burdensome
it is to go through a court fight for your rights. Accordingly, he
particularly admired the individuals who were so staunch and
tenacious in asserting their rights, that they pursued them all
the way to the Supreme Court. He interviewed an impressive
sampling of such individuals, whose cases led to landmark
rulings of constitutional law. Those interviews became the cen-
terpiece of his book, The Courage of Their Convictions: Sixteen
Americans Who Fought Their Way to the Supreme Court.49 As
Peter wrote in his Preface, these sixteen individuals, whose
cases led to historic constitutional law rulings, "include women
and men. They are black, white, Hispanic, and Asian. They are
gay and straight. They are carpenters, bartenders, doctors, and
lawyers. They live in all sections of our country. They profess
many religions and none. They are united only by their diversi-
ty."" And also, of course, they are guided by the courage of
their convictions.5
The sixteen heroic individuals featured in this inspiring book
include some young people--for example, Mary Beth Tinker,
48. See PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS vii (1988).
49. Id.
50. Id. at xi.
51. See id. at 11 ("There are faces behind the 'masks of the law,' voices behind
the pages of the Court's opinions, people who speak to us in this book. Each face is
distinctive, each voice is unique, each life is different. Backgrounds vary, motivations
differ. But this chorus of sixteen harmonizes a common refrain: courage and convic-
tion.").
1998] 465
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:457
who was only thirteen when she was dismissed from school for
wearing a black armband to protest the Vietnam War, thus
launching the leading students' rights case that bears her
name.
52
To this day, the ACLU continues to represent brave young
individuals who stand up for their own rights and, thereby,
help to establish principles and precedents that enhance the
rights of others.
I would like to quote one of the ACLU's young clients in one
of our recent, important victories in the Supreme Court, Lee v.
Weisman.5" Significantly, this case involved the rights of young
people at school. Our client, Deborah Weisman, was only thir-
teen years old when the case started. Thanks to Deborah and
her family, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to issue a
significant ruling that protects religious liberty for everyone
against government-sponsored prayer at official, school-spon-
sored events, and in that case, graduation ceremonies. The
Court reaffirmed that such government-supported prayer-in
contrast with prayer by individuals or families or religious
communities-violates the "separation of church and state" that
is mandated by the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause.54
I have enormous admiration for all persons who stand up for
any right, who usually do not make themselves popular with
their peers by doing so. That is inevitable, since by asserting
individual rights, they are necessarily challenging decisions or
actions that are supported by the majority of the members of
their particular communities. Indeed, this core fact prompts a
question I am frequently asked about the ACLU's cases involv-
ing separation of church and state, or other civil liberties:
"What about the rights of the majority?" For example, why
should Deborah Weisman's school not include a prayer as part
of the official graduation ceremony, if a majority of the students
and their parents would favor it?55
52. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
53. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
54. See U.S. CONST. amend I.
55. Circuits are split as to whether "voluntary, student-initiated" graduation
prayer is constitutional. Compare Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th
466
STUDENTS' RIGHTS
To be sure, the majority of any community or governmental
unit does have significant rights or powers, but they are not
unlimited under our system of government." The framers of
our Constitution deliberately declined to design a purely
majoritarian form of government. They recognized that even
elected representatives, reflecting the will of the majority of
their constituents, could ride roughshod over the rights and
interests of some individuals, particularly those that belong to
unpopular or unpowerful minority groups. Therefore, in order to
check the "tyranny of the majority"57 against which James
Madison warned, our Constitution recognizes that some rights
are so fundamental that no majority may take them away from
any minority, no matter how small, disempowered, or unpopu-
lar it might be. The Bill of Rights was added to the original
Constitution to underscore and entrench this principle.
So, under our governmental system, individual rights are
respected in theory. But, as I have already discussed, where
individual rights are concerned, there is often a wide gap be-
tween theory and reality. Consider the litany of blatant viola-
tions that I recited above, at the time of the ACLU's founding,
almost 130 years after the Bill of Rights was ratified." It is
one thing for our system to respect individual rights in theory.
It is another thing to actually stand up and demand that they
be respected. That's where we-and our brave clients-get into
trouble! Our clients too often become pariahs at best, and tar-
gets of persecution and harassment at worst. That is certainly
Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995) (holding
that student-initiated graduation prayers are unconstitutional), with Jones v. Clear
Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950
(1993) (holding that graduation prayers do not violate any of the tests set forth by
the Supreme Court and are thus constitutional); see also Thomas A. Schweitzer, The
Progeny of Lee v. Weisman: Can Student-Invited Prayer at Public School Graduations
Still Be Constitutional?, 9 BYU L. REV. 291 (1995).
56. See West Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (explain-
ing that "[tihe purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from
the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts").
57. ROBERT J. MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 199 (1988) (stating that rule by a majority is "the most tyrannical and intol-
erable of all").
58. The Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791. See C. HERMAN PRITCHE T, CONSTITu-
TIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES 3 (1984). The ACLU was founded in 1920. See WALKER, su-
pra note 36, at 47.
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true in our cases involving "separation of church and state."5 9
As is so often true when religion is concerned, feelings run very
deep.
So I am particularly grateful when people are willing to put
their personal lives on the line-sometimes quite literally-in
order to stand up for our religious liberty. And I especially
admire someone like Deborah Weisman, who did it at such an
early stage in her life, when she was thirteen years old. Here
are Deborah's own words, from a letter posted on the ACLU's
Website:
Hi, I'm Deborah Weisman. My involvement with the
issue of church/state separation began in 1986 when my
older sister, Merith, was graduating from junior high ....
I'll never forget how uncomfortable I felt when a Baptist
minister led us in a prayer at the ceremony. I had always
felt that religion is important and has its place, but I didn't
think a public school was that place. My parents sent the
school a letter that was never answered.
Three years later, just before my own eighth grade grad-
uation, my parents called the school to bring up the prayer
issue again. A teacher told them, "We got you a rabbi."
They thought we objected to the minister just because we're
Jewish! But a rabbi wouldn't have made it any better:
Prayer in public school was what we objected to. The school
board told us that graduation prayer was a tradition. If we
had a problem with the practice, they said, we could sue.
And that's just what we did. The ACLU of Rhode Island
assigned us a lawyer, who asked the federal court to order
the school board to stop having graduation prayers. The
court ruled in our favor, the school board appealed, we won
again, and the school board appealed again-this time to
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court hears less
than 5 percent of the cases brought before it, so we were
surprised when the Justices agreed to hear our case.
Almost three years after my eighth grade graduation and
nine days after my high school commencement . . . , we
won: When a public school sponsors a prayer of any faith,
the Supreme Court said, it violates the First Amendment.
59. See Nadine Strossen, Lisa Herdahl and Religious Liberty, 46 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. (Forthcoming 1998); see also Nadine Strossen, Religion and Politics: A Reply to
Justice Antonin Scalia, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 427 (1997).
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Throughout the years of waiting for a ruling, we were ha-
rassed by hate mail and even death threats, and the media
attention often bothered me. But... at no time did I re-
gret having taken our case to court. What amazes me is
that it only took me and my family to make a difference. 0
As I said earlier, our victory in Deborah's case, Lee v.
-Weisman, is, unfortunately, not as typical as I would like. To be
sure, we're still winning major victories, including the Supreme
Court's landmark 1997 ruling that secured free speech on the
Internet, Reno v. ACLU.6 This was a major civil liberties
milestone for minors and adults alike. The Supreme Court held
that government may not restrict online communications in
cyberspace for the sake of shielding minors, when the price is
that adults also are denied access to those communications. 2
Moreover, the Court noted that young people have free speech
rights of their own."
Notwithstanding significant victories such as Lee v. Weisman
and Reno v. ACLU, though, we are losing cases too, including
cases for young people. Let me tell you about one such case
since it reflects an all-too-typical negative attitude toward
young people's rights on the part of the majority of current and
recent Supreme Court Justices. The case is Vernonia School
District v. Acton," in which the Court held that a junior high
school could impose mass, random urinalysis drug tests on all
of its students who wanted to participate in any athletic activi-
ty, even if there was absolutely no reason to suspect that a
particular student had actually used drugs.
Our client in this case, James Acton, was only twelve years
old when the case began. Here is his explanation of why he
objected to the suspicionless drug testing program, from his
letter on the ACLU's Website:
60. The ACLU Website, Letter from Deborah Weisman (visited Feb. 22, 1998)
<http-//www.aclu.org/court/clients/dweis.html>.
61. 117 S. Ct 2329 (1997).
62. See id. at 2346.
63. See id. at 2356-57; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magical-
ly only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.").
64. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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Hi. My name is James Acton and I [challenged] my
school['s] drug testing policy because I believe in the right
guaranteed to me by the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. It says we have the right "to be secure
in our persons, houses, papers, and effects against unrea-
sonable searches."
This right prevents our houses from being searched
against our will without a search warrant. Just as the gov-
ernment should not be allowed to search our house without
a warrant, finding things we may wish to be private, the
government should not be allowed to search our bodies
either. This would say that our bodies are less private than
our homes.
Making kids take a drug test without any proof that they
are taking drugs is just like searching a house without a
warrant or proof of something wrong.
[My] school ... had no reason to think I was taking
drugs. I wanted to play sports and I was one of the smart-
est kids in the class. I never even got a referral to the
principal's office. I thought that was proof enough that I
wasn't taking drugs. So I refused to take the test ....
It may seem a little difficult to believe that a 12-year-old
thought of this all by himself. But its [sic] not too difficult
to understand the right to privacy. I think everybody should
be taught that they have that right, before it is taken
away.6
I agree with James, and so did a number of judges who ruled
on his case, including three Supreme Court Justices.6 6 Unfor-
tunately, the latter three were dissenting from the majority's
ruling, which held that public junior and senior high school
students could be subjected to mass or random suspicionless
urinalysis drug tests. Perhaps, as has happened throughout our
history, a position that is initially expressed in a dissenting
opinion may ultimately be adopted by a future majority as the
law of the land. Probably the most famous instance also in-
65. The ACLU Website, Letter from James Acton (visited Feb. 22, 1998)
<http//www.aclu.orgcout/clients/acton.html>.
66. Acton lost at the district court level. See Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 796 F.
Supp. 1354 (D. Or. 1992). The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed. See Acton v. Verno-
nia Sch. Dist., 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994).
A majority of the Supreme Court ruled against Acton. See Vernonia Sch. Dist.
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). Justice O'Connor, however, wrote a lengthy dissent, in
which Justices Stevens and Souter joined. See id. at 666.
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volving the rights of young people in school was Brown v.
Board of Education,7 the 1954 ruling that overturned the
Court's 1896 decisioii in Plessy v. Ferguson.'
During the oral argument in the Supreme Court in the Acton
case, at the very outset of the argument by the ACLU attorney
who was representing James Acton, Justice Antonin Scalia
expressed his view that students in public schools have very
limited rights. 9 He referred to precedents in which the Court
had held that students have no constitutional protection against
corporal punishment 7 -- not even the procedural right to re-
ceive some kind of advance notice or opportunity to respond to
the charges at issue.7 Ironically, the Court has ruled that
while the Eighth Amendment protects convicted felons against
"cruel and unusual punishments" while in prison,72 in contrast,
67. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
68. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
69. See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *43, Vernonia Sch.
Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (No. 94-590), available in 1995 WL 353412 (Jus-
tice Scalia noting that one "cannot assume that children in [public schools] . . . have
all of the rights that an emancipated adult has ... ."); id. at *52 (Justice Scalia as-
serting, "But [in this case] you're dealing with children. You're not dealing with
adults who have a totally different set of rights.").
70. See id. at *52 (Justice Scalia explaining that "[t]here may be parents who
don't like corporal punishment in schools .... but.., it existed at common law, and
[the Court does not] use the Eighth Amendment to say you can't have it .... ").
71. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment does not apply to
discipline in public schools, and that the due process clause does not require notice
and a hearing before corporal punishment is imposed).
In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that corporal pun-
ishment in public and private schools is subject to the constraints of Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits "inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment." FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 478 (2nd ed. 1996). As a result, the United King-
dom has prohibited corporal punishment in state schools. See id; see also Frances
Gibb, Changing the Law Would Put Britain on Trial, THE TiMEs, Oct. 30, 1996; San-
dra Maler, Another Blow to British Tradition-Caning to be Banned, REUTERS, Aug.
14, 1987.
72. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (explaining that "[a) prison
official's 'deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of harm to an inmate violates
the Eighth Amendment"); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (holding that a
prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim could be based on harm to health resulting from
his exposure to environmental tobacco smoke); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4
(1992) (holding that use of excessive force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and
unusual punishment even though the prisoner does not suffer serious injury); Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1991) (holding that prisoners claiming that conditions
of confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment were required to show "de-
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public school students who have not even been charged with
disciplinary infractions-let alone convicted of crimes-have no
such protection, under either the Eighth Amendment or other
constitutional provisions."
Significantly, Justice Scalia authored the Court's decision in
the Acton case, and throughout it he consistently stressed that
young people in our nation's public schools are second-class
citizens in terms of their constitutional rights. When referring
to junior and senior high school students, he repeatedly and
consistently used the term "children"74 rather than "minors" or
"young people," thus infantilizing the teenagers-some on the
verge of entering college, the military, and full-time jobs-who
could be subjected to mass urinalysis drug-testing programs
under the Court's rationale. Even more significantly, he con-
trasted public school students with "free adults,"75 thus high-
lighting the view that students are not free.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the ringing dissent in Acton
was written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor," who had been
appointed to the Court by President Ronald Reagan and could
hardly be accused of being a flaming liberal! She pointed out in
her dissent that, as a result of the majority's ruling, completely
innocent students in our nation's public schools apparently have
fewer rights to be protected from the indignity and intrusive-
ness of suspicionless urinalysis drug tests than do convicted
felons serving time in our nation's prisons.77
Notwithstanding disappointing rulings and rationales such as
those in the Supreme Court's Acton decision, we are still win-
liberate indifference" on the part of prison officials).
73. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664.
74. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-56, 658, 662, 665 & n.4
(1995).
75. See id. at 655.
76. See id. at 666.
77. See id. at 680-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The instant case ... asks
whether the Fourth Amendment . . . is so lenient that students may be deprived of
[its] only remaining and basic, categorical protection: its strong preference for an
individual suspicion requirement, with its accompanying antipathy toward personally
intrusive, blatant searches of mostly innocent people. It is not all that clear that
people in prison lack this categorical protection .... ) (emphasis added). Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, responded that "[tihere is no basis for the dissents
insinuation that . . . [the majority] equat[es] the Fourth Amendment's status of
schoolchildren and prisoners. . .. " See id. at 664 n.3.
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ning many civil liberties victories on behalf of students and
young people, even in the drug-testing area. That is because
the Supreme Court's interpretations of the United States Con-
stitution are not the only avenue for protecting individual
rights, including students' rights. State court judges may inter-
pret their state constitutions as affording more protection for
individual rights than the United States Supreme Court has
interpreted the United States Constitution to afford-even when
the pertinent state constitutional provision closely tracks, or
indeed is identical to, the corresponding federal constitutional
provision.7' Thus, while the majority of United States Supreme
Court Justices rejected the arguments of James Acton and the
ACLU that his school's drug-testing program constituted an
impermissible search and seizure under the United States Con-
stitution, a state court judge would be free to rule that such
programs constitute impermissible searches and seizures under
the state constitution.79
In addition to state constitutions, students' and young
people's rights may also find sources of enhanced protection in
state statutes, state educational regulations, and policies of
individual school districts. For example, even after the Supreme
Court substantially cut back on students' free speech rights in
78. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (noting that states have the
option of providing greater protections to their citizens through their own constitu-
tions, even where the text of the state constitutional provision is identical to the
federal constitution); People v. Barber, 46 N.E.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. 1943) (noting that,
when reviewing questions involving fundamental rights protected under the state
constitution, state appellate courts are not bound by the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States that interpret similar questions under the federal constitu-
tion); see also Gayl Shaw. Westerman, The Promise of State Constitutionalism: Can it
be Fulfilled in Sheff v. O'Neill?, 23 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 351, 354 (1996) ("Today, no
commentator and certainly no judge... would deny that state courts have the pow-
er, and indeed the duty, to independently interpret their own constitutions."); see
generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986);
Hans A. Linde, On Reconstituting "Republican Government". William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Lecture Series in State Constitutional Law, 19 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 193 (1994).
79. See Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regl* Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (analyzing the case under both the federal and state
constitutions and holding that school's policy of requiring students to submit urine
samples for drug testing violated students' right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure, their rights to due process and their legitimate expectation of privacy
and personal security).
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its 1986 ruling in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, °
many students continue to enjoy the more robust free speech
rights that the Supreme Court had recognized in the Tinker
case, thanks to these other sources of protection.
The ACLU recently successfully defended the rights of two
Massachusetts high school students, Jeff and Jonathan Pyle, to
wear t-shirts with messages that some teachers and adminis-
trators deemed offensive. This students' rights victory was
grounded on a Massachusetts statute"1 that ensured the same
strong protection for student expression that the Supreme Court
had assured in Tinker: that student expression could be re-
stricted only if it would "materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school." 2
We also continue to win significant lower court victories for
young people under the United States Constitution. Recently,
for example, both the federal district court in Washington, D.C.,
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
have sustained our constitutional challenges to teen curfew
laws in Washington, D.C., and San Diego, California.'
And in many instances we are able to help young people
exercise their rights without having to rely on any judges or
courts, merely by talking to and negotiating with their school
80. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
81. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 82 (West 1991).
82. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)
(quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
The district court upheld the portion of the school's dress code that restricted
vulgar expression by students. See Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp.
157, 159 (D. Mass. 1994). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit certified a question of state law to the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts. See Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Comm., 55 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1995). In
answering the First Circuit's certified question, the Massachusetts court held that
high school students in public schools have the freedom under statute in Massachu-
setts (G.L. c.71 § 82) to engage in expression that may reasonably be considered
vulgar, but does not cause disruption or disorder. See Pyle v. South Hadley Sch.
Comm., 667 N.E.2d 869, 871 (Mass. 1996).
The messages deemed offensive were printed on t-shirts and included: "See
Dick Drink. See Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don't be a Dick" and "Coed Naked Band:
Do it To the Rhythm." See Pyle v. South Hadley Sch. Dist., 861 F. Supp. 157, 158
(D. Mass. 1994).
83. See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997); Hutchins v.
District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1996).
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officials. For example, we recently persuaded school officials in
Bellevue, Washington to retract their punitive actions against a
student who had posted a parody of his school's newspa-
per-which was clearly labeled as such-on his personal
Website.'
But none of the potential tools or strategies for protecting the
rights of students and young people can have any positive effect
unless there are actually young individuals who are willing to
invoke them, to assert their rights, and to pursue their possible
remedies by seeking out the ACLU or other legal assistance.
We could not have won Tinker, Weisman, or any of the other
victories that redound to the benefit of all young people-and,
indeed, all individuals-without the brave young clients who
had "the courage of their convictions," and spoke up against
violations of their freedoms.
To underscore the importance of speaking up for your
rights-and, hence, for everyone's rights-I would like to quote
my favorite ACLU t-shirt, which was designed by the ACLU of
Southern California. Thanks to TV shows and films about crime
and police, we all know that "you have the right to remain
silent." The message on this t-shirt, though, reminds us that we
have another right, equally precious, yet not as widely known
or exercised; it says, "You have the right NOT to remain
silent."
84. See Case Involving Free Speech and the Internet is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
24, 1995, at 16; The ACLU Website, ACLU-W Backs Student Punished for Internet
Parody (visited Feb. 22, 1998) <http://www.aclu.orgfcommunity/washing/wanews2.html>.

